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ABSTRACT
The four experiments presented support Boyer’s theory that counterintuitive concepts have
transmission advantages that account for the commonness and ease of communicating
many non-natural cultural concepts. In Experiment 1, 48 American college students
recalled expectation-violating items from culturally unfamiliar folk stories better than more
mundane items in the stories. In Experiment 2, 52 American college students in a modi ed
serial reproduction task transmitted expectation-violating items in a written narrative more
successfully than bizarre or common items. In Experiments 3 and 4, these  ndings were
replicated with orally presented and transmitted stimuli, and found to persist even after
three months. To sum, concepts with single expectation-violating features were more
successfully transmitted than concepts that were entirely congruent with category-level
expectations, even if they were highly unusual or bizarre. This transmission advantage for
counterintuitive concepts may explain, in part, why such concepts are so prevalent across
cultures and so readily spread.
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Around a large citrus ranch in California, the locals all know about the
Chivo Man who roams the “haunted dairy.” Presumed by some to have
been invented a generation ago by a mother trying to keep her children
away from crumbling buildings, the story of the elusive and dangerous
part-goat Chivo Man is now part of local cultural knowledge and regarded
by many as true. Around the world and throughout the centuries people
have shared stories and tales about animals that talk, artifacts that have
feelings, and people with superhuman powers. These non-natural concepts
spread with ease within and between cultures. Unlike natural concepts such
as “water” and “food” that have de nite and repeatedly veri ed real-world
instantiations, these less mundane cultural concepts typically lack regular
reinforcement through experience. Rarely does anyone actually report an
encounter with the Chivo Man. Why then do concepts such as these occur
across cultures and spread so well?
One way to account for the prevalence of types of concepts is how
well they are remembered and transmitted (Boyer 1994; Sperber 1996).
For a concept to become a part of a cultural system, somehow it
must be represented in individual minds and passed on or transmitted.
Sperber has even argued that “Culture is the precipitate of cognition
and communication in a human population” (p. 97), and proposed an
epidemiological program in the study of cultural representations: “To
explain culture, then, is to explain what and how some ideas happen to be
contagious” (p. 1). All else being equal, a concept that is easily remembered,
with rich conceptual structure grounding it, will be transmitted more
successfully and thus be more common than concepts that are dif cult
to remember or represent. To explain cross-cultural regularities or how a
new concept could spread within and between cultures, what is needed is
a set of conceptual mechanisms that is pan-cultural: essentially inevitable
given innately speci ed cognitive biases plus ordinary interaction with the
world in any cultural setting.
The two most prevalently discussed classes of conceptual structures
are schemas and scripts, both of which are sets of culturally informed
expectations used to interpret and remember stimuli that have been built
up over past experiences (Bartlett 1932; Brewer & Nakamura 1984; Rubin
1995; Schank & Abelson 1977). Both facilitate ef cient communication
by allowing speakers of a common culture or set of relevant experiences
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to make assumptions about what others already know. Because schemas
and scripts are used to  ll in ambiguous or missing information, they
often serve a conservative effect in the transmission of ideas: unless stated
otherwise, ordinary properties, events, or relations are assumed (Rubin
1995; Rumelhart 1977; Thorndyke 1977; van Dijk & Kintsch 1978).
Additionally, in some contexts, concepts or features of an account that
do not  t with the anticipated script or schema are dif cult to integrate
and thus remember accurately (Harris, Schoen & Hensley 1992). Using the
wrong schema or script to interpret and encode a narrative or situation
has also been shown to cause distortions or omissions in what is recalled
(Bransford & McCarrell 1974).
In some tasks (e.g., when using recognition measures instead of
recall, or after very short delays), script inconsistent information is
frequently remembered better than elements that meet the expectations
for that scenario (Gaesser, Woll, Kowalski & Smith 1980). However, the
inconsistent items in these previous studies disrupted the script structure or
were irrelevant, rather than integrated into a structure such as a narrative
as occurs in real folk tales. Whereas research on schemas emphasizes their
typically conservative function in the transmission of cultural materials,
some memory research using within-subject designs also demonstrates that,
much like perceptually distinctive stimuli are recalled better than non-
distinctive stimuli, semantically or conceptually incongruous material is
recalled more than surrounding mundane material (Schmidt 1991; Waddill
& McDaniel 1998; Imai & Richman 1991).
Although research on schemas and scripts suggests the possibility that
incongruent concepts may be better remembered thus contributing to
their transmission, these conceptual structures are culturally variable to
a large extent and will not provide an explanation for cross-culturally
prevalent classes of concepts. The best developed account of how such
conceptual systems might help explain cultural systems and religious
systems in particular is Boyer’s (1994) treatment of “counterintuitive”
concepts. Drawing heavily on the work of developmental and cognitive
psychologists studying concepts, conceptual structure, and ontologies,
Boyer’s theory contends that for any category, such as animal or artifact,
people regardless of culture, hold a host of intuitive assumptions about
its member’s properties. These assumptions, in turn, are the consequence
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of a host of intuitive theories (Keil 1989; Gelman & Markman 1986).
For example, because a cat is an animal, our intuitive or folk biology
applies to cats and we tacitly assume that cats have nutritional needs and
will eventually die. These are two properties of “cat” that need not be
explicitly represented or communicated. Further, we expect cats to move
purposely to ful ll their needs. These intuitive expectations provide the
basic structure to concepts.
What distinguishes many “religious” and some cultural concepts from
other concepts is that religious concepts typically possess a small number of
features that violate category-level expectations (Barrett 2000; Boyer 1994,
1995, 2000). For example, a person who can pass through solid objects
(a ghost) is counterintuitive, satisfying the bulk of intuitive expectations for
the category of intentional agents but possessing one category violation
concerning physical properties. Concepts of these sorts are common in
religious systems and folk tales from around the world. As has been
argued elsewhere (Sperber 1994), it is these counterintuitive properties that
make religious concepts salient. Increased salience, in turn, enhances the
likelihood that the concept will be remembered and passed on.1
Expectation-incongruent or “counterintuitive” does not necessarily
mean unusual, surprising, or dif cult to think about. A theologian may
 nd it very easy and common to reason about God’s omniscience but that
does not mean that an intentional agent who knows everything does not
violate expectations at the category level. Counterintuitive in this technical
sense means that a member of a particular category (e.g., animal, artifact)
possesses a feature that violates intuitive expectations that are regularly
acquired by children in any cultural setting for a given category.
Previous research on conceptual structures and memory dynamics
is encouraging, but was not intended to test if counterintuitive concepts
1The claim that intuitive ontology-violating properties of concepts make them salient
and more likely to be remembered and transmitted should not be confused with the
controversial claim that concepts that conjure bizarre imagery are more likely to be
remembered (Einstein, McDaniel & Lackey 1989). A concept may be bizarre or unusual
(e.g., a 100-pound beetle) and not violate any intuitive assumptions. Likewise, a concept
may clearly violate intuitive assumptions and not necessarily evoke bizarre imagery (e.g.,
a mountain with no mass). The two hypotheses are orthogonal. Boyer’s claim is that, all else
being equal, expectation-incongruent concepts will be better remembered and transmitted
than mundane or merely bizarre concepts.
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have a mnemonic advantage (see Boyer & Ramble, in press, as a notable
exception). The following four experiments begin to address the hypothesis
that, all else being equal, concepts that have a property that violates
intuitive assumptions for that thing’s category membership will be better
remembered and transmitted than other concepts.
Experiment 1
To test the hypothesis that expectation-incongruent concepts are more
memorable than standard concepts, an experiment was constructed and
results analyzed along the lines of Bartlett’s serial reproduction studies.
Using an American Indian story, “The War of the Ghosts” (1932),
Bartlett had subjects read the story and then retell the tale in writing.
These retellings were then read and retold by other subjects. Over
several generations of retellings, Bartlett reported that culturally unfamiliar
concepts became distorted to better  t cultural schema, while other non-
schematic concepts were forgotten. Most strikingly, Bartlett observed that
although the story’s title suggests that the story features ghosts, the concept
of ghost had been eliminated over the course of ten retellings. In trying
to capture both omissions and distortions in a single explanation, Bartlett
argued that culturally unfamiliar, non-schematic concepts such as ghosts
and canoes are more dif cult to represent and thus less likely to be
remembered and transmitted faithfully. In addition to Bartlett’s study, other
cross-cultural studies have repeatedly demonstrated that stories from one’s
own cultural setting are better remembered and retold than stories from
other cultures (e.g., Kintsch & Greene 1978; Steffensen & Colker 1992),
and that the tendency to distort a story from another culture to  t one’s
own cultural knowledge increases with length of delay before recall (Harris,
Schoen & Hensley 1992).
Despite this supporting research, if expectation-violating concepts are
more salient than standard ones and thus have a transmission advantage
as Boyer’s theory suggests, then Bartlett’s  nding is problematic. Several
methodological issues make his conclusion suspect. In his explanation of
his  ndings, Bartlett fails to distinguish between omissions and distortions
of concepts, leaving unanswered the question of why the concept of ‘canoe’
was remembered while that of ‘ghost’ was forgotten. Furthermore, Bartlett
relied on only one story whose idiosyncrasies might have contributed to the
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eventual omission of the “supernatural” features of the story. In addition,
Bartlett’s experiment was set up in such a way that the recall rate of the
culturally exotic, expectation-violating items was not compared to that of
culturally familiar items, so the rate of omission might not be above chance.
Experiment 1 involves a reexamination of Bartlett’s  ndings with sim-
ilar stimuli, American Indian folktales. Since American Indian stories are
generally unfamiliar to non-American Indian North American university
students, and historic American Indian culture is likewise unfamiliar, the
use of such stories should limit the effect of culture-based schema on mem-
ory, allowing non-cultural ontological assumptions to surface. Native Amer-
ican stories are also appropriate to this study since they are the products
of oral tradition involving many generations of retellings and are thus rep-
resentative of most simple cultural narratives around the world.
Method
Participants. Participants were 48 university students, 21 female, ranging in
age from 18 years to 21 years, with a mean age of 18.7 years. None of
the participants were American Indian. Half of the participants read and
retold one set of three stories, and half the other three stories.
Materials and Procedure. In hopes of avoiding the problem of using an
unrepresentative story, ten stories of 500 words or less were randomly
selected from a collection of 166 American Indian stories (Erodes & Ortiz
1984). To maximize thematic and stylistic differences in the sample, one
story from each of the ten thematic divisions of the collection (e.g., creation
stories, trickster stories, end times, etc.) was randomly selected. Of these
ten stories, four did not contain any counterintuitive characters or events
and so were not used in the experiment. The remaining six stories were
randomly ordered and divided into groups of three. Six stories were used
rather than one to help control for any idiosyncrasies of any particular
story.
To illustrate, one story told of two children waiting by a  re while
their grandmother climbed to the top of a mountain to fetch a special
plant. The grandmother diligently struggles to the top only to roll down
the mountain to her death when the plant pulls out of the ground in her
grasp. The grandmother’s bones then walk home singing. The children
hear the singing and know that their grandmother has been transformed.
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Thus, they run inside their dwelling, covering the opening. The children
then transform themselves, one turning into a burning stick and one into
a blue stone.
Participants in the experiment were read one group of three stories
all the way through, one time slowly. After participants completed
an unrelated questionnaire requiring approximately 15 minutes, the
experimenter instructed participants to retell the stories in the same order
they had heard them, recording the retelling in writing on lined notebook
paper.
We hypothesized that concepts or events with counterintuitive features
would be remembered and retold more accurately than concepts with only
common features.
Results and Discussion
The stories participants generated were coded simply for recall of
expectation-violating concepts and ordinary concepts. For example, in the
story about the transformed grandmother, there are two basic expectation-
violating concepts: the events of the grandmother’s dead bones coming
back to life, and of the grandchildren turning themselves into a blue stone
and a stick burning at one end. The ordinary concepts in the story were
a mountain, a plant, rocks, a house, and a mine (blanket). Expectation-
violating concepts were relatively easy to identify because they are almost
always a single event or property. However, ordinary concepts can be
demarcated in many ways. To keep from in ating the number of ordinary
concepts (and thereby increase the chance of them being forgotten), any
reference to an explicitly mentioned object, person, or activity was coded
as remembering the general concept. For example, in the transformed
grandmother story, the plant that the grandmother climbs the mountain
to retrieve is described as “a plant which the Indians use for food,”
participants were not required to recall “Indians” and “food” in addition
to the concept “plant”; the mention of “plant” alone was suf cient.2
2Since coders would have to  rst agree on what constituted a bit of information from
the story, then which bits were remembered, and  nally which bits were counterintuitive,
only a single coder was used. Consequently, the results are most helpful when combined
with Experiments 2, 3 and 4.
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Averaging across both sets of stories, the 20 counterintuitive concepts
(8 in one set and 12 in the other) were recalled 60.4 percent of the time
(SD D 20:7 percent), whereas the 46 control concepts (18 in one set and
28 in the other) were recalled 43.3 percent of the time (SD D 18:1 percent).
This difference was signi cant, t .23/ D 8:08, p < :001.
As with Bartlett’s studies, the retellings demonstrated several types of
changes from the original stories. In his studies of serial reproduction,
Bartlett noted three main classi cations of change: omission, in which con-
cepts are completely forgotten; rationalization, in which participants forge
explanatory links and provide reasons for occurrences; and transformation
of detail, in which unfamiliar concepts are transformed into more familiar
concepts. All three types of change were evident in the retellings.
Transformation of detail occurred with culturally unfamiliar concepts
in many of the retellings: a buffalo chip was remembered as a cow chip
and a wood chip, the Salt Lake was remembered as the Great Lakes, and
a man  shing from the shore was remembered as a man  shing from a
boat. Some of the changes involved the simpli cation of a more complex
concept rather than a complete transformation of detail: speci c listings of
plants were remembered as crops and plants, the pinon tree remembered
as just a tree, and the old man’s decree that if the wood chip  oats people
will die and after four days come back to life was remembered simply as if
it  oats then people will live forever.
Rationalization was exhibited in a number of participant’s recollections
of the stories. For example, in the story of the “Greedy Father,” the
wife and children turn into a bear lily, a hazel bush, and a pine tree
and are now said to “line up in front of rich people, baskets in the
deerskin dance” (p. 321, Erodes & Ortiz 1984). One participant retold
this section of the story in a more rational, cohesive way, explaining
that “trees and bushes are used to make baskets.” Another participant
demonstrated rationalization by interpreting the story, “Woman Chooses
Death,” as “the Garden of Eden with a bit of a twist.” In retellings of the
story, “The Transformed Grandmother,” two participants rationalized the
part of the story in which the grandmother “pulled too hard, and away
she rolled down the mountainside,” by inferring that she fell because “a
rock slipped” or “she lost her balance.”
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A small number of concepts suffered omission in most of the retellings.
Proper names were often omitted, and sometimes distorted: the town of
Cochiti was remembered as a pueblo called Chiripaw, the pinon tree
remembered as chimperon tree and perapah tree. Contrary to Bartlett’s
 ndings conclusions, omissions in Experiment 1 mainly involved common
concepts. Moreover, this study revealed no evidence that counterintuitives
were omitted more often than other concepts. If anything, counterintuitive
concepts were remembered better than other concepts.3
Although the rate of successful transmission in this experiment is
suggestive, the design prohibits strong conclusions. Since the narrative
format used did not allow for control of the importance, frequency, and
development of concepts in the story, any number of factors might account
for the results. In addition, the stories used were traditional tales that
had been retold countless times and so the printed editions are likely the
product of cognitive selective pressures that might have already tailored
the stories to be maximally transmittable.
Despite the possible interference of factors due to design, this experi-
ment challenges the assumption that culturally unfamiliar and expectation-
violating concepts always present transmission dif culties. At least in the
context of these stories representative of actual folk tales, the concepts
which violated intuitive assumptions were remembered and retold better
than more common concepts that concur with assumptions, setting the
stage for more controlled studies.
Experiment 2
To retest the suggestion that a concept with a limited number of properties
that violate categorical expectations might be remembered and transmitted
more faithfully than a concept which meets expectations, a story was
constructed that allowed for a controlled number of both concepts
with expectation-violating properties and concepts with mundane, control
properties. The story described an inter-galactic ambassador’s visit to a
3Contrary to the overall results, one expectation-violating concept, that of the magic
crystal in the story of the Salt Woman, was forgotten more than the other expectation-
violating concepts in that story and in the other stories (only two subjects recalled the
crystal at all and only one remembered that it was magic) and the omission was not
straightforward, but involved a transfer of magic power from the crystal to Salt Woman.
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museum on another world (see Appendix A). This museum had 18 exhibits:
six that illustrated various types of physical objects, six that illustrated
various types of living things, and six that illustrated various types of
intentional agents. As in Bartlett’s serial reproduction, the  rst “generation”
of participants were asked to read the story and then retell it from memory.
The second generation read those retellings and retold them. The measure
of central interest was how well the 18 exhibits were remembered and
transmitted from generation to generation.
Method
The experimental manipulation was the version of the 18 exhibits
with which participants were presented. Each exhibit had ontological
information (living thing, physical object, or intentional agent), plus a
sentence description of a property. These properties were one of three
types: expectation-violating items possessed a feature that violates intuitive
assumptions for the object’s category membership (e.g., a living thing
that never dies violates assumptions about all living things); bizarre
items possessed a highly unusual feature that violates no category-level
assumptions but may violate basic-level regularities (e.g., a living thing
that weighs 5000 kilograms may be unusual for a dog, but weighing
5000 kilograms does not violate assumptions about living things in general);
and common items possessed an ordinary feature for their category
membership (e.g., a living thing that requires nutrients to survive). Table 1
lists examples from the story used.4
4To insure that the counterintuitive levels of each item were not easier to vividly
imagine, thus potentially giving them a mnemonic advantage, an independent group of
14 participants (9 female; mean age, 20.8) rated each of the items “how easy it is for
you to form a vivid mental image of them” on a seven-point scale with a low score
representing ease. Counterintuitive versions were signi cantly rated as more dif cult to
imagine (M D 5:01, SD D 1:08) than either the bizarre items (M D 3:69, SD D :82), or the
common items (M D 2:19, SD D 1:11), and so if anything there would be a bias against
the counterintuitives. The same precaution was taken for the stimuli used in Experiments 3
and 4, with a sample of 15 adults (9 female; mean age, 20.7 years). There was no evidence
that counterintuitive items (M D 3:99, SD D 1:04) were easier to create a vivid image
of than the bizarre items (M D 4:37, SD D 1:06), t .14/ D 1:15, p D :267. However,
counterintuitive items were signi cantly more dif cult to imagine than common items,
M D 2:17, SD D 1:38, t .14/ D 3:51, p D :003.
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Table 1
Selected items from Experiment 2 representing all three item types and all three levels
Intentional Agent
Counterintuitive “a being that can see of hear things no matter where they are. For
example, it could make out the letters on a page in a book hundreds
of miles away and the line of sight is completely obstructed.”
Bizarre “a being that can see or hear things that are far away. For example,
it could make out the letters on a page in a book if it is as much as
50 feet away, provided the line of sight is not obstructed.”
Common “a being that can see or hear things that are not too far away. For
example, it could make out the letters on a page in a book if it
is no more than eight feet away, provided the line of sight is not
obstructed.”
Living Thing
Counterintuitive “a species that will never die of natural causes and cannot be killed.
No matter what physical damage is in icted it will survive and
repair itself.”
Bizarre “a species that is does not die easily of natural causes and is hard
to kill. If any of its principal parts are severed it will still live with
the remaining parts.”
Common “a species that will die if it doesn’t get enough nourishment or if it
is severely damaged. If any of its principal parts are severed, it will
surely die.”
Physical Object
Counterintuitive “an object that is completely invisible under any viewing condi-
tions.”
Bizarre “an object that is dif cult to see under normal lighting conditions
even with the aid of a microscope.”
Common “an object that is easy to see under normal lighting conditions from
within about 50 feet away.”
Materials. All three versions of each of the 18 items were generated and
written such that they were as similar as possible. Each of the three different
versions of the story had six expectation-violating items, six bizarre items,
and six common items. Similarly, for each ontological grouping (living
A crossing error led to one set of physical objects being under-represented, appearing
in only two instead of three versions of the story, and another set being over-represented,
appearing four times. This did not change the overall number of counterintuitive, bizarre,
or common items that were presented, and did not alter the results in any detectable way.
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things, physical objects, intentional agents), each level appeared twice in
a given story. Each of these three story versions also had three different
orders to control for any order effects. Consequently, in all there were nine
different versions of the story with each item and level appearing the same
number of times.
The stories were structured to ensure maximum control over compli-
cated variables such as the role of objects in the narrative structure and
amount of repeated exposure to a given concept. Though the story had a
main character, a true beginning and a true ending, the appearance or-
der of the test items was irrelevant for the narrative structure as was any
particular item.
Participants. Eighteen college students participated in each of the three
generations, two for each of the nine versions of the story, for a total
of 54 participants ranging in age from 16 to 25, with a mean age of
18.8 years. Thirty-four were female.
Procedure. In the  rst generation, participants read their story once through
“carefully” and then one more time through. After a delay of approx-
imately two minutes (the time it took for each to move to a computer
terminal and type in a story number, age, and sex, and receive instruc-
tions) participants typed out the story as best they could from memory.
This generated two retellings of each of the nine story versions. Partici-
pants in the second generation then read both retellings for one of the
nine original stories one time carefully. For example, one would read the
two retellings of story version #1, another would read the two retellings of
version #2, and so forth. Before reading, the experimenter told participants
that they were reading two versions of the same story. The second gener-
ation participants were then asked to retell the two retellings they read as
one story. Again, this produced two retellings of each of the nine stories.
The procedure followed by Generation 2 was repeated for Generation 3.
Participants in Generations 2 and 3 read both retellings from the
previous generation to maximize the chance for all information to be
preserved. One problem with a serial reproduction design is that once
information is omitted from a series, it is gone for good. One forgetful
person at the beginning of the chain would permanently lose a concept.
Another reason for cross-fertilizing the transmission process was to better
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approximate what happens when stories are passed down in a real cultural
setting. Rarely is information disseminated in a completely linear manner.
In this task, Boyer’s theory leads to the prediction that assumption-
violating items should be remembered and transmitted more successfully
than common items. Bizarre items were included just to see if non-
counterintuitive properties, if salient, would be transmitted just as well
or better, as suggested by previous research.
Results and Discussion
Two hypothesis-blind, independent coders scored the produced stories
for two things: (1) which of the original items (from the original story
or the previous generation) were remembered and recorded in some
identi able form, and (2) whether the recorded items were described
as counterintuitive, bizarre, or common.5 With these two pieces of
information, it was determined which items were best remembered in any
form, and which item type was best represented by the end of transmission.
Domains of items (agents, living things, and objects) were collapsed for
these analyses.
Of the original items from the  rst stories, counterintuitive and bizarre
items were remembered signi cantly more often than common items. By
the time the third generation retold the stories, on average 5 of the original
18 items per story were left, 2.11 counterintuitive items (SD D :96),
1.89 bizarre items (SD D 1:41), and .89 common items (SD D :96).
Paired t-tests comparing each type with each of the other two detected
signi cant differences between both counterintuitive and common items,
t .17/ D 4:65, p < :001, and between bizarre and common items,
t .17/ D 2:64, p D :017. This pattern held across all three types of items
(living things, intentional agents, and physical objects). So, just considering
if an item was remembered at all, counterintuitive features do seem to
provide some advantage over common features. However, this advantage
might have nothing to do with violating intuitive assumptions, but might
simply be because these features are more interesting. Bizarre items, which
do not have counterintuitive features but are also unusual and interesting,
showed the same advantage over common items.
5Inter-rater agreement was 85.0%. Disagreements were resolved through discussion.
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Considering how items were remembered provides more telling infor-
mation. After three generations of retellings, along with many of the items
being forgotten, many items were distorted. Some items that began as
bizarre became common (12.5% of bizarres), and some common items be-
came bizarre (22.2% of commons). But by far the largest type of shift was
from bizarre to counterintuitive. While only 7.2% of counterintuitive items
that were transmitted degraded into bizarre items, 37.5% of bizarre items
became counterintuitive items after repeated retellings. Consequently, on
average, participants in Generation 3 remembered 2.72 items as counter-
intuitive items (SD D 1:49), as compared with 1.39 as bizarre (SD D 1:33),
and .89 as common (SD D :96). The differences between counterintu-
itive and bizarre, t .17/ D 5:62, p < :0001, are signi cant. The differ-
ence between bizarre and common recall is not signi cant, t .17/ D 1:16,
p D :261. Again, this pattern holds across the three item types and for all
three generations. Table 2 shows these results. Results of Generation 2 are
not reported because they are redundant with Generations 1 and 3.
That common items were remembered so poorly relative to other
items is particularly surprising given the reaction of some participants to
these items. Since in normal discourse intuitive properties are assumed
and not explicitly stated, some subjects reported that these items were
particularly odd and memorable. In some instances of retelling these items,
Table 2
Experiment 2 results: Mean number of items recalled per subject as being a given type,
by ontology
Biological Physical Psychological Total
Generation 1
Counterintuitive 1.39 1.22 1.28 3.98
Bizarre 1.17 0.83 1.22 3.22
Common 0.72 0.78 0.78 2.28
Total 3.28 2.83 3.82 9.39
Generation 3
Counterintuitive 0.56 1.39 0.78 2.72
Bizarre 0.33 0.50 0.56 1.29
Common 0.28 0.39 0.22 0.89
Total 1.17 2.28 1.56 5.00
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participants tried to make the common property sound exciting or unusual.
For example, a physical object that could be moved at speeds of 100 miles
per hour were said to move at amazingly fast speed (like 100 miles per
hour), even though almost any physical object can be moved at this speed.
In this task, concepts with minimal expectation-violating properties
stood a better chance of surviving transmission than concepts that satis ed
all intuitive assumptions. This facilitated transmission was due to two
factors: counterintuitive concepts were simply more memorable, and
unusual properties tended to be changed into counterintuitives.
Experiment 2 offered some evidence that expectation-violating con-
cepts are better remembered and transmitted than merely bizarre concepts
or mundane ones. However, Experiment 2 had some shortcomings. First,
while fairly carefully controlled, the narrative used was arti cial in style,
using a setting (other world) commonly associated with counterintuitive
concepts as found in science  ction, and only giving ontological informa-
tion about objects (e.g., living thing) instead of basic level labels (e.g., dog).
Second, Experiment 2 used written stimuli while traditionally, stories and
cultural concepts are transmitted orally. Third, recall was only examined
immediately following transmission, whereas in natural settings transmis-
sion of a concept may occur long after exposure to the concept. Finally,
the style of transmission was only a modest approximation of how informa-
tion is spread in a culture. Real world transmission involves actual face to
Table 3
Experiment 2 target items imbedded in the story
Counterintuitive Items A dog composing a symphony
A rose jumping
Shoes sprouting roots
A carrot that speaks
An iridescent blue horse
A snow ake that burns clothing
Control Items A slimy feeling earthworm
Crumpled newspaper blowing in the wind
Brittle, fallen leaves
A bird with bright red feathers
An aromatic shrub
A red picket fence
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face interactions, hearing different versions from multiple speakers, and the
effects of telling stories multiple times. Experiments 3 and 4 were attempts
to extend the  ndings to these other contexts.
In Experiments 3 and 4, a group of adults in a single room served as
a small, mock-village or cultural group. The experimenter told a subset of
the group a story and then asked the subset to initiate a series of retellings
within the greater group.
Experiment 3
Method
Participants. Thirteen male and ten female college students ranging in age
from 18 to 20 (M D 18:7 years) from an introductory psychology class at a
Midwestern American liberal arts college participated to ful ll part of their
course requirements.
Materials. A story was composed by a student author about a boy and
girl walking home from school. On the way home, they encounter twelve
target items, six expectation-violating items and six control items. A list
of ordinary objects including plants, animals, and inanimate objects was
generated. Then a subset of these objects were selected randomly. Objects
were randomly assigned to be either counterintuitive or control items with
ontological category membership balanced across the two groups. That is,
three of each item type were inanimate, two were animals, and one was a
plant. Table 2 displays the twelve target items imbedded in the story. The
complete text may be found in Appendix B.
Because the author constructed the story such that it sounded like a
natural narrative rather than a formulaic listing of items, the protagonists
(the boy and the girl) interacted with and reacted to the objects in
different ways depending on the nature of the object. Consequently, not
all items were mentioned the same number of times or interacted with
the same number of times. To insure that this irregularity did not result
in a bias for remembering the counterintuitives, two strategies were used.
First, the author’s narrative was modi ed slightly to make the number of
mentions and interactions comparable. The six counterintuitive items were
mentioned a total of 15 times (including pronouns) versus 14 times for
the control items. Similarly, the children interact with the control items
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10 times versus 7 times for the counterintuitive items. Additionally, post
hoc linear regression analyses showed that neither the number of times an
item was mentioned nor the number of times the children interacted with
the items signi cantly predicted rate of item recall.
Procedure. The experimenter gathered participants in a single room and told
them that they would be told a story that they should then tell to at least
two other people. The experimenter placed no restriction on to whom the
participants should choose to tell the story, but encouraged the participants
to move about the room and tell anyone they liked. After giving these
instructions, the experimenter extracted eight participants from the room
and took them to an adjacent room. There, the experimenter told the
eight participants the original story and then sent them back to the  rst
room to retell the story. After all participants had been told the story, the
experimenter asked them to each write their age, sex, and best account
of the story on lined notebook paper. Then, without telling participants
that they would be contacted again, the experimenter contacted students
three months after initially participating and asked them to recall the story
again.
Results
Two independent coders scored the stories produced by the participants
for which of the original target items were recalled and if they were
recalled accurately, i.e., having the original feature.6 Paired t-tests were
used to examine differences in recall rates between item type (control versus
counterintuitive items). These results are illustrated in Figure 1.
Immediate recall. Examining simply which items were recalled at higher
frequency regardless of which features were remembered along with
the item, counterintuitive items were recalled signi cantly more often
than control items, t .22/ D 7:36, p < :001. Participants recalled
counterintuitive items 71.1 percent of the time on average (SD D 22:2)
compared with 43.5 percent (SD D 24:5) for control items. Five of the six
most frequently remembered items were counterintuitive items.
6For the stories produced immediately following transmission, raters agreed 96.4 percent
of the time. For the stories produced after a three-month delay, raters agreed 92.2 percent
of the time. Raters resolved disagreements through discussion.
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Figure 1. Experiment 3 results for immediate recall. Mean recall by coding
criteria and item type. Differences between counterintuitive and control items are
signi cant for both criteria.
Figure 2. Experiment 3 results for three-month delayed recall. Mean recall by
coding criteria and item type. Differences between counterintuitive and control
items are signi cant for both criteria.
When using stricter criterion of accurate recall (i.e., recalling items
with the same features as in the story), the same pattern emerged.
Participants recalled counterintuitive items 57.2 percent of the time on
average (SD D 26:5) compared with 21.0 percent (SD D 20:2) for control
items, t .22/ D 7:11, p < :001. The three most frequently accurately
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recalled items were counterintuitive, whereas the four least frequently
accurately recalled items were control items.
Three-month delayed recall. Of the 23 original participants, only 17 were
successfully contacted three months later. As with stories produced
immediately following transmission, participants recalled counterintuitive
items more frequently than control items when considering if items were
recalled at all, t .16/ D 3:38, p D :004, and when considering whether
items were recalled accurately, t .16/ D 2:89, p D :011. On average,
participants recalled 35.3 percent (SD D 26:3) of the counterintuitive items
in some form and 18.6 percent (SD D 26:3) accurately. Of the control
items, 16.7 percent (SD D 20:4) were remembered in some form on
average, and 2.9 percent (SD D 8:8) of them accurately. Figure 2 illustrates
these results.
Discussion
As in Experiment 2, participants remembered and transmitted counterin-
tuitive items better than control items. Unlike Experiment 2, the vehicle
story for the concepts was more similar to natural narratives in setting,
style, and descriptions of the items. Similarly, the oral, conversational style
of the transmission, allowing participants to tell the story to whomever they
wanted, was also more naturalistic. Finally, the recall advantage of coun-
terintuitive items after a three month delay suggests that the mnemonic
advantage of these concepts may not be limited to immediate retellings.
Experiment 4
Whereas participants in Experiment 2 transmitted counterintuitive con-
cepts more successfully than “bizarre” items, items were deemed “bizarre”
a priori. Perhaps participants found counterintuitive items more bizarre
than the “bizarre” items and remembered them better for this reason, not
because of violations of expectations. Similarly, the transmission advantage
of counterintuitive items in Experiment 3 could be because the control
items appeared too mundane to be worthy of attention. Experiment 4 was
an attempt to address these issues by replicating Experiment 3 with bizarre
items replacing the control items, and asking subjects to rate the bizarreness
or novelty of all the items for an independent measure of bizarreness.
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Method
Participants. Eighteen female and nine male college students ranging in age
from 17 to 19 years (M D 18:3) from an introductory psychology class at
a Midwestern American liberal arts college, participated to ful ll part of
their course requirements.
Materials and Procedure. The experimenter told participants the same story
as in Experiment 3 with minor modi cations. The control modi ers
used in Experiment 3 were replaced with modi ers that would make the
objects extremely unusual or bizarre without becoming counterintuitive or
undermining category membership. For example, the crumpled newspaper
from the original story became a bright pink newspaper — highly unusual
for a newspaper, but still a newspaper. Other modi cations include: a
warm, fuzzy worm replaced a slimy-feeling worm, leaves as big as tables
replaced brittle leaves, a bird swallowing nails replaced a bird with bright
red feathers, a shrub that smells like laundry detergent replaced an
aromatic shrub, and a rubber picket fence replaced a red picket fence.
Consequently, the story contained six counterintuitive target items and six
bizarre target items. Otherwise, the story and transmission process were
identical to Experiment 3.
To examine more carefully if the previously demonstrated transmission
advantage for counterintuitive items is another instance of the novelty
effect often found in within-subjects designs (Waddill & McDaniel 1998),
after writing the story following transmission, participants rated each of
the twelve items for bizarreness or novelty. The experimenter gave each
participant a sheet of ratings in which participants rated on a  ve point
scale “have you ever seen or encountered” each item in (1) “real life” or
(2) “in movies, books, or anywhere else (other than this experiment).” The
scale ranged from 1 D “yes, many times” to 5 D “no way, never.” The
two ratings for each item were combined to yield a “novelty” rating.
Results and Discussion
Two independent coders scored the stories produced by the participants for
which of the original target items were recalled and if they were recalled
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accurately.7 As in Experiment 3, paired t-tests were used to examine
differences in recall rates between item type (bizarre versus counterintuitive
items). These results are illustrated in Figure 3. As in previous experiments,
counterintuitive items enjoyed a transmission advantage that appears
independent of familiarity or novelty of the concepts.
Immediate recall. Examining simply which items were recalled at higher
frequency regardless of which features were remembered along with
the item, counterintuitive items were recalled signi cantly more often
than bizarre items, t .26/ D 10:37, p < :001. Participants recalled
counterintuitive items 82.7 percent of the time on average (SD D 12:6)
compared with 40.1 percent (SD D 17.5) for control items. Five of the six
most frequently remembered items were counterintuitive items.
When using the stricter criterion of accurate recall (i.e., recalling
items with the same features as in the story), the same pattern emerged.
Participants recalled counterintuitive items 74.7 percent of the time on
average (SD D 15:6) compared with 32.7 percent (SD D 19:9) for bizarre
items, t .26/ D 11:01, p < :001. Five of the six most frequently accurately
recalled items were counterintuitive.
Interestingly, as in Experiment 2, some of the bizarre items trans-
formed into counterintuitive items through transmission. The most com-
mon distortion of this kind was for the bright pink newspaper blown by
the wind. Of the ten participants who remembered the newspaper, six re-
called it as walking or running, not blowing in the wind. It is tempting to
speculate that memory for the newspaper might have been even poorer if
it had not been animated through retellings.
Three-month delayed recall. Twenty-one of the 27 original participants were
successfully contacted and provided data. As with stories produced
immediately following transmission, subjects recalled counterintuitive items
more frequently than bizarre items when considering if items were recalled
at all, t .20/ D 2:74, p D :013, or recalled accurately, t .20/ D 2:87,
p D :009. On average, participants recalled 34.1 percent (SD D 25:0) of
the counterintuitive items in some form and 23.0 percent (SD D 21:4)
7For the stories produced immediately following transmission, raters agreed 96.0 percent
of the time. For the stories produced after a three-month delay, raters agreed 95.2 percent
of the time. Raters resolved disagreements through discussion.
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Figure 3. Experiment 4 results for immediate recall. Mean recall by coding
criteria and item type. Differences between counterintuitive and bizarre items are
signi cant for both criteria.
Figure 4. Experiment 4 results for three-month delayed recall. Mean recall by
coding criteria and item type. Differences between counterintuitive and bizarre
items are signi cant for both criteria.
of them accurately. In contrast, participants only recalled 19.0 percent
(SD D 15:2) of the bizarre items on average, and 11.9 percent (SD D 12:0)
of them accurately. These results appear in Figure 4.
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Novelty ratings. As expected, participants rated both counterintuitive items
and bizarre items as extremely unusual or novel. However, participants
rated bizarre items as more novel than counterintuitive items and novelty
did not predict recall. On a  ve-point scale, bizarre items had a mean
novelty rating of 4.47 (SD D :367) with counterintuitive items rated 4.36
(SD D :289) on average. This difference was signi cant, t .26/ D 2:21,
p D :036, with bizarre items considered slightly more novel or unusual.
Consequently, a multiple linear regression predicting item recall from
novelty ratings and item type (counterintuitive versus bizarre) detected
no recall advantage related to higher novelty ratings once item type was
statistically controlled. However, the partial relationship between item type
(controlling for novelty) was a signi cant predictor for both general and
recall rate, t .11/ D 2:63, p D :027, and for accurate recall, t .11/ D 2:92,
p D :017.
General Discussion
The four experiments presented above support Boyer’s theory that
counterintuitive concepts have transmission advantages that account for
the commonness and ease of communicating many non-natural cultural
concepts. In Experiment 1, participants recalled expectation-violating items
from culturally unfamiliar folk stories better than more mundane items in
the stories. In Experiment 2, participants in a modi ed serial reproduction
task transmitted expectation-violating items in a written narrative more
successfully than bizarre or common items. In Experiments 3 and 4, these
 ndings were replicated with orally presented and transmitted stimuli, and
found to persist even after three months. To sum, controlling for factors
such as the role objects play in a story, the ecological relevance of the
concepts, and motivational factors concerning the relaying of a concept,
concepts with single expectation-violating features were more successfully
transmitted than concepts that were entirely congruent with category-level
expectations, even if they were highly unusual or bizarre. This transmission
advantage for counterintuitive concepts may explain, in part, why such
concepts are so prevalent across cultures and so readily spread.
The results converge with the  ndings of Boyer and Ramble’s
(forthcoming) cross-cultural studies in which participants more accurately
recalled items violating category-level expectations than items meeting
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expectations. Their research also demonstrated little difference between
cultures in sensitivity to such violations.
The theory tested here does not claim that semantically- or script-
incongruent concepts will be remembered better than congruent ones,
but instead explores the pan-cultural mechanisms upon which scripts
and schemas rely by testing the mnemonic advantage of concepts which
contain violations of expectations at the category level (i.e., living things,
physical objects, and intentional agents). Consequently, these  ndings
do not challenge story comprehension theories that maintain that non-
schematic or script-incongruent ideas, events, and concepts will not be well
remembered but forgotten or distorted to  t schematic expectations (e.g.,
Rubin 1995), but involve a fundamentally different theory.
While the experiments presented do not directly address possible
mnemonic advantages for concepts that evoke bizarre imagery (Einstein,
McDaniel & Lackey 1989), they do suggest that some bizarre images
might be remembered better than other images because they represent
an expectation-violating concept. However, as suggested above, not all
expectation-violating concepts stimulate bizarre imagery and not all bizarre
images are expectation-violating concepts.
The most striking thing about these data is that some intuitive but
unusual properties were transformed into expectation-violating properties
(Experiments 2 and 4), suggesting that some expectation-violating prop-
erties might be easier to represent. How could that be? Perhaps coun-
terintuitive features that are mere negations of intuitive assumptions are
easier to “tag,” and therefore keep track of, than complicated, common
features. For example, it could be easier to remember that some living
thing will never die than that some living thing will die after its blood-
alcohol level reaches .4, provided its blood-sodium levels are less than .05.
In the counterintuitive case, one need only put a negative tag on an intu-
itive assumption (that living things eventually die), but in the bizarre case,
all of the conditions must be encoded.
Some support for this speculation can be found in Ward’s (1994, 1995)
work on “structured imagining.” When adults were asked to draw and
describe novel imaginary animals from a totally different world, it was
found that they tended to structure the animals based on the intuitively
assumed properties of the concept “animal.” When participants did deviate
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from these intuitions, the deviations were almost always simple negations of
an intuitive assumption. In this way the intuitive properties of the governing
category still structured the novel concept.
Another bit of supporting evidence comes from Experiment 1. In one
story, “Woman Chooses Death,” Old Man proposes that to decide whether
or not humans will experience death, he will throw a buffalo chip into a
river. If the chip  oats, humans will die but come back to life after four
days. What would happen if the chip sinks is never stated in the story.
Several participants who retold this story remembered the bargain as being
if the chip  oats, people will live forever. This subtle distortion suggests that
the simpli ed concept, “To live forever” is easier to represent than “to live
for some time, die, and four days later come back to life.” Note, however,
that these may both be expectation-violating concepts.
If expectation-violating features facilitate transmission, why, then, are
expectation-violating and “religious” concepts the minority of cultural
concepts? Numerous other factors, such as frequency of concept exposure,
attention paid to that exposure, motivation for communication, ease of
concept reproduction, and conformism effects undoubtedly in uence the
production and transmission of concepts (Boyer & Ramble, forthcoming).
For example, a village might have a concept of “ghost” that is reinforced
every time something mysterious happens such as an illness, a missing
chicken, or a freak storm, but the concept “water” as something good for
drinking is reinforced many times daily. Although ecological factors cannot
be completely controlled, holding factors such as frequency of exposure
constant, it appears that expectation-violating concepts might possess some
advantages.
Does this suggest that the more counterintuitive features a concept has,
the better? No. Too many counterintuitive features would undermine the
structure of the concept. Its relations to relevant causal theories would
be disrupted. A cat that can never die, has wings, is made of steel,
experiences time backwards, lives underwater, and speaks Russian, would
no longer be much of a cat. Consequently, the causal schemata would no
longer generate sensible intuitive expectations, and so there would be no
counterintuitive properties, but a list of disconnected features. What Boyer
proposes is a cognitive optimum: a balance between satisfying ontologically-
driven intuitive expectations and violating enough of them to become
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salient (Boyer 1995). Concepts that meet this balance may be termed
minimally counterintuitive.
If it is true, as Boyer argues, that many religious concepts are minimally
counterintuitive and thus enjoy facilitated transmission, the data presented
above corroborate the arguments of several scholars applying insights
of cognitive science to the study of religion. Each of these scholars has
maintained that religious beliefs and practices are “natural” or “intuitive”
in the sense that they primarily enlist ordinary cognitive resources. Lawson
and McCauley have shown how religious rituals are undergirded by
garden-variety action and agent representations (1990). Guthrie (1993)
maintains that gods are explained by an overactive agent detection device
that cares little if a postulated agent has some non-human qualities such
as invisibility since being able to reason about unseen agents would
have had great survival value in our evolutionary past. Similarly, Barrett
and colleagues (Barrett, in press; Barrett & Keil 1996; Barrett, Richert
& Driesenga, in press) have argued that concepts of religious agents,
such as gods, are largely informed by intuitive assumptions governing all
intentional agents, making these easy concepts to entertain and use in
many contexts. Adding to these other cognitive perspectives on religious
concepts, an explanation for how religious concepts might be so easily
transmitted may build a cumulative, naturalistic explanation for much of
religion in general.
The results presented here demonstrate the importance of intuitive
conceptual structures in informing and constraining the spread of cultural
materials that extend beyond mundane concepts or experiences. Many
people know about ghosts, not because they have frequent interaction
with them, or because knowledge about them is important for successful
survival, but because they largely  t intuitive assumptions about agents
while possessing a small number of expectation-violating features that make
them interesting and memorable. Returning to the Chivo Man, he could
have become such a widely known local character not because of any
particular importance he holds in everyday life or because of any actual
interaction with him. Rather, a part-animal, part-human creature violates
one of our expectations for animals while maintaining rich inferential
potential based on pan-cultural category-level knowledge.
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Appendix A
One version of nine used in Experiment 2
I was sent as a diplomat to the planet Ralyks. Because the decision was
very sudden and I didn’t have a lot of time to research Ralyks, I decided
to take a visit to Ralyks’ equivalent of the Smithsonian — a large network
of museums and zoos intended to provide a representative sampling of all
of the different kinds of things of this world.
The  rst building I entered was a huge cross with four wings, devoted
to the various types of beings that initiate action in this world. They all
act and behave in ways that are motivated by internal states. They don’t
just respond to their environment, they act on in as well. In the  rst one,
perhaps the most telling wing, was a  ne collection of restaurants and gift
shops. All of them were outrageously overpriced, so I went on to the rest
of the building.
The next wing I went into was painted blue and contained exhibits
devoted to the various types of beings that initiate action in this world. In
the  rst room was a type of being of which all members normally are able
to reproduce. Each member of the species has two biological parents.
The second room illustrated a being that will never die of natural
causes and cannot be killed. No matter what physical damage is in icted it
will survive and repair itself. Rounding a corner, I came upon an exhibit
concerned with a being that is aware of its own existence and usually
conscious of what it is doing. It knows when it is thinking and knows when
it is trying to do something.
To the south of this room was one containing a being about the size
of a young human that is impossible to move by any means.
The next room had in it a being about the size of an adult human
that weighs about 150 pounds.
In the last room of the wing was a being that is easy to see under
normal lighting conditions from within about 150 meters away.
The next wing I went into was painted red and contained exhibits
devoted to the various types of beings that initiate action in this world. In
the  rst room was a being that can see of hear things no matter where
they are. For example, it could make out the letters on a page in a book
hundreds of miles away and the line of sight is completely obstructed.
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The next exhibit featured a being that has no desires that motivate
what it does. It never wants something, it just goes after things for no
reason. It never wants to do things, it just does things randomly.
I continued through the dimly lit hall and came to an exhibit about a
being that is able to pass through solid objects. Being the size of an adult
human, it can pass directly through solid objects.
Adjacent to this room was a display dedicated to a kind of being that
requires nourishment and external sources of energy in order to survive. It
consumes and metabolizes caloric materials to sustain itself.
After going up a few steps, I came to a room that displayed a being
that can move quickly. It can moved at speeds of about 20 miles per hour.
The next room I came to featured a being that can be completely in
more than one place at a time. All of it can be in two or all four different
corners of the room at the same time.
The next wing I went into was painted yellow and contained exhibits
devoted to the various types of beings that initiate action in this world. The
 rst exhibit I came to was about a being that never uses beliefs to guide its
actions. For example, if it wants a banana, and it believes that a banana is
in a box in the corner of the room, it will search randomly anyway as if it
doesn’t know the banana is there.
Then next exhibit concerned a being that can remember an unlimited
number of events or pieces of information. For example, it could tell you
in precise detail, everything it had witnessed in the past, and if you read it
a list of 10 billion words, it would remember them all  awlessly.
The third exhibit featured a being that can pay attention to any
number things all at the same time. For example, if ten people or ten
billion people were talking to it at the same time, it would be able to keep
track of what all of them were saying.
Near the end of the hall was another room featuring a being that is
chie y comprised of carbon-based molecules.
At the end of the hall were two more exhibits. One was a room devoted
to a type of being that gives birth to and raises offspring that are the same
type of being. Parents and offspring are always the similar.
The  nal exhibit of this wing featured a being that grows and changes
most of its life cycle. At birth it must grow considerably to reach maturity;
and after reaching maturity, it then changes as it deteriorates.
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I left the building and went to my new of ce to ponder all of the things
that can be found on Ralyks.
Appendix B
Story used in Experiment 3
A girl and a boy, sister and brother, were walking home from school on
an ordinary day in an ordinary town. As they were walking towards home,
they came upon a dog belonging to one of their friends. The dog crouched
on the front lawn as it composed a symphony.
Since the dog was completely absorbed in its work, the two siblings
continued on their way, chatting about what they had learned in school
that day, until a beautiful rose jumped right in front of their path.
The children knew that they must be getting home, or else their mother
would begin to worry, so they slipped away from the rose. They had hardly
made any progress in their journey, when they noticed an earthworm
crossing the sidewalk. The girl picked it up and felt its slimy texture and
the squirm of its movement. She placed it on the grass on the other side
of the pavement and they continued on their way.
As they were walking, the boy’s shoes sprouted roots which broke up
the pavement below and impaired his movement. He had had this trouble
with these shoes several times before and always carried a pocket knife in
order to cut the roots.
While the boy was engaged in the process of uprooting himself, a
crumpled piece of newspaper blew past the girl in the cool breeze, brushing
past her leg.
The children continued on their way. The leaves, which had fallen
from the trees a while ago, were brittle and crackled under their feet. The
children swished their way through the numerous leaves. The boy stopped
to gather them in his arms and throw them at his sister.
They soon became hungry and so the boy reached into his backpack to
retrieve a bag of carrots which he had not eaten during his lunch. She was
just about to take a bite of one of the carrots when it screamed, “Stop!”
The children then decided that perhaps they had better not eat any more
carrots.
The children continued on their way until the girl paused to notice a
bright red bird perched on the branch of a nearby tree. She explained to
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her brother that the red feathers of the bird signi ed that it was male. The
boy moved towards the bird, but it sensed his approach and quickly  ew
away.
The boy’s behavior angered the sister, and so she ran ahead of him.
She crossed the road and walked along a rolling  eld, her brother trailing
behind her. Soon a horse ran along the edge of the  eld to where the
boy was standing. He called to his sister, and forgetting her anger, she ran
to see what he wanted to show her. The horse was a dazzling iridescent,
almost transparent blue. The had seen this horse galloping across the  eld
many times before, but this was the  rst time that they had been able to
examine it up close.
As the children stood gazing at the animal, they noticed a beautiful
and aromatic shrub nearby. It had a very fragrant smell that reminded
them of their garden at home.
The sky had become a little darker since they had left school and soon
a few snow akes fell from the sky. The boy caught one of the sleeve of his
jacket. It burned a hole in his jacket.
The air had turned cold, but the children were almost home. The
soon caught sight of the brown picket fence in their very own front yard.
They ran towards it and easily swung upon the gate of the fence. Their
mother was inside and greeted them with hot chocolate and cookies while
the children told her about their day.
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